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Essay 
When Is It OK to Limit Direct Democracy? 
Shaun Bowler†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
This Essay considers the question of the conditions under 
which it is acceptable for courts to place limits on the exercise 
of direct democracy, and says something about the kinds of lim-
its that may be placed. In examining the question of when it is 
permissible for courts to limit direct democracy I make four 
main points. 
The first point is that criticisms of direct democracy 
grounded in empirical patterns are often overstated. To date, 
the search for how to place limits on direct democracy has 
seemed to be ad hoc. Criticisms of the process are often ground-
ed in empirical claims that are overstated.1 This is not to say 
that direct democracy cannot—or should not—be restricted, 
just that the arguments advanced so far have not been terribly 
persuasive. Concerns about direct democracy seem to cycle 
around several common themes that focus on the competence of 
voters and their supposed inability to deal with the demands of 
direct democracy.2
The second point concerns the role of representatives in re-
lation to direct democracy. Not only is the yardstick of repre-
sentative democracy a poor one against which to judge direct 
democracy, it is also important to note that elected representa-
tives play a major—and far from positive—role in direct democ-
 By and large these claims are neither terri-
bly new nor terribly persuasive in their own right, but they are 
even less persuasive in providing a rationale for limiting the 
practice of direct democracy.  
 
†  Professor, UC Riverside. I would like to thank the University of Min-
nesota Law School, the Law Review and members of the Law Review for host-
ing the conference, along with thanks to my fellow participants for comments 
and feedback. Copyright © 2013 by Shaun Bowler. 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Part I. 
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racy.3 While attention has been focused on the initiative pro-
cess it is important to see the initiative process in relation to 
the use of referenda at the state level. Introducing referenda 
into the discussion gives a fuller picture of direct democracy, 
one that shows the inter-relationship between politicians and 
direct democracy. Furthermore, many criticisms aimed at elec-
tions in direct democracy also apply to elections in representa-
tive democracy.4 Critics of direct democracy, for example, often 
suggest that special interests play a large role in direct democ-
racy elections,5 but special interests are often held to influence 
candidates,6
The third point considers the leading principled argument 
against direct democracy: the “republican form of government” 
component of the Guarantee Clause. Many argue that this 
clause provides a justifiable means to limit or even remove di-
rect democracy processes from state constitutions.
 suggesting that if the criticisms of voting and vot-
ers justify limiting direct democracy elections, they also justify 
limiting elections in representative democracy. Clearly no one 
is seriously supportive of abandoning electoral democracy. 
What seems to be needed is a set of better justifications for lim-
iting the exercise of direct democracy, preferably justifications 
that apply limits to both direct and representative democracy 
in sensible ways or allow for limitations to be specifically tar-
geted towards direct democracy.  
7
The fourth point elaborates how the idea of sovereignty 
provides a basis for limiting some aspects of direct democracy 
via the courts and, further, provides some quite specific guid-
ance as to the form of those limits. While the idea of sovereign-
ty may not provide the blanket ban that critics of direct democ-
 But this 
line of argument, too, is not especially helpful in limiting direct 
democracy in general. Nor is it helpful in providing a basis for 
specific suggestions over what to limit; rather, it seems to be a 
general purpose tool that critics of direct democracy hope may 
be used to shut down processes of direct democracy altogether. 
Even if it were usable as a tool, it is, then, a particularly blunt 
one. 
 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 17, 18 (1997). 
 6. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Catharine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the Repub-
lic for Which It Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1059 (1996). 
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racy hope to see, it would introduce some limits that would 
make the process either a little harder to use or easier to 
amend. 
This Essay is structured in four parts that address each of 
those points in turn.  
I.  THE MANY CRITICISMS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY   
Direct democracy is typically subject to many criticisms. As 
a consequence of these criticisms, there are many calls to re-
form the use of direct democracy.8 Generally speaking, pro-
posals for reform consist of measures intended to limit the ini-
tiative process in some way to make it harder to use or easier to 
amend or both. Calls for reform from politicians and commen-
tators typically involve a measure of dislike of direct democracy 
and a determination to impose limitations.9 Legislators are a 
fertile source of proposed reforms.10 That is, we very rarely see 
legislators advocate lower signature thresholds or a longer pe-
riod for qualification, either of which would help promote more 
frequent use of the process. Instead we see proposals to raise 
signature thresholds or ban paid signature gathering.11 The 
National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) 2002 report 
made thirty-four recommendations relating to direct democracy 
that ranged in scope from suggestions that voters be provided 
with a public information guide to the recommendation that 
states not adopt the initiative process at all.12
 
 8. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 
 These reforms 
and recommendations by NCSL and others are typically justi-
fied by appeal to the perceived shortcomings of the process that 
5, at 17–19; Rogers & Faigman, supra 
note 7, at 1071–72. 
 9. See Lessons from California: The Perils of Extreme Democracy, ECON-
OMIST, Apr. 23, 2011, at 11.  
 10. For example, Sen. Mark DeSaulnier (D-Concord) proposed prohibiting 
initiative measures that would have a net increase in government costs from 
being submitted to the voters unless the legislative analyst and state finance 
director agree the measures also provide new revenue that covers the costs. 
Patrick McGreevy, Limit Costly Initiatives? Idea Falls Short in California 
Senate, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012, 9:10 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
california-politics/2012/08/california-initiatives.html; see also Anthony York, 
State Democrats Consider Bill to Ban Initiatives from Primaries, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 2011, at A1.  
 11. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R TASK FORCE 12, 39–43 (2002) [herein-
after NCSL 2002 REPORT], available at http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/ 
legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_Report.pdf (discussing legislative action related to 
signature requirements). 
 12. Id. passim.  
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are grounded in criticisms of how direct democracy works in 
practice.13
Criticisms of direct democracy are, for example, often tied 
to the shortcomings of voters.
 That is, the “reforms” are often justified on the basis 
of empirical claims that provide criticisms of how direct democ-
racy elections work. 
14 Voters, goes this line of criti-
cism, are too easily baffled by the complexities of the issues, or 
too easily swayed by the TV ads of special interest groups or 
both to be able to make sensible choices over the alternatives 
on offer; alternatives that often owe more to interest groups 
pushing narrow interests than the public good.15 The fact that 
opportunities for deliberation are limited in direct democracy 
means that these kinds of shortcomings cannot be mitigated, 
and if they are put into the constitution, they cannot easily be 
amended.16 Policy outputs reflect these shortcomings and are 
likely to be short sighted, narrow minded, wrong headed or 
some combination of all three and, worse, lead step by step to 
something approaching a disaster. Typically drawing heavily 
on California experience, commentators paint a picture of 
ungovernability that is a direct consequence of direct democra-
cy.17
 
 13. Id. 
 
 14. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 294. 
 15. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 18. 
 16. The ease with which initiatives may be amended varies by state. 
Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Measuring the Effect of Direct Democracy on 
State Policy: Not All Initiatives Are Created Equal, 4 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 
345, 348–49 (2004). 
 17. For representative examples of these criticisms of direct democracy 
see, for example, DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAM-
PAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: 
CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE (1998); Chemerinsky, supra note 14; California’s 
Legislature, The Withering Branch, THE ECONOMIST SPECIAL REPORT: DE-
MOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA, Apr. 23, 2011, at 10; Elizabeth Garrett & Matthew 
McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative Framework (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch. 
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 15, 2006), available at http://law.bepress 
.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=usclwps-lss. These kinds of 
arguments may be bundled together with others that consider the link be-
tween direct and representative democracy in the attitudes and behaviours of 
voters. Some recent debates, for example, address whether the initiative helps 
support constructive or destructive attitudes in publics. One version of this 
argument is that a positive set of attitudes and behaviours (turnout, efficacy, 
and so on) are supported. Daniel A. Smith & Caroline J. Tolbert, The Initiative 
to Party: Partisanship and Ballot Initiatives in California, 7 PARTY POL. 739 
(2004); Mark A. Smith, Ballot Initiatives and the Democratic Citizen, 64 J. 
POL. 892 (2002). A rival set of arguments suggest that these findings are over-
stated and that initiative use in particular generates mistrust in general, 
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The problem for this critique is that a sizeable body of em-
pirical work shows that the critique is, at best, overstated and, 
at worst, wrong—especially when it comes to the issue of voter 
competence. This literature is too well established to require 
much rehashing in any great length. Essentially, a series of 
works have shown that voters, generally, do know what they 
are doing in the ballot booth.18 In behavioral terms this means 
that voters use a mix of strategies to decide on how to cast a 
vote.19 This might involve abstention or it might involve cue-
taking of various forms (which actors back the proposal, who is 
targeted by the proposal) that help sort out which ballot is-
sues.20 But voters do not always need cues. Many proposals are 
quite straightforward. Decisions to extend the death penalty or 
forbid gay marriage, for example, are what Carmines and 
Stimson might term “easy” issues in the sense that people will 
typically have responses to these issues in part based on their 
own attitudes.21 Other coping strategies include using the “how 
to vote” cards issued by parties.22
To be sure, there are examples of propositions that can 
readily be seen to generate confusion—especially when there 
may be conflicting measures on the same ballot. There are also 
 
 
Joshua J. Dyck, Initiated Distrust: Direct Democracy and Trust in Govern-
ment, 37 AM. POL. RES. 539 (2009); Joshua J. Dyck & Edward T. Lascher, Jr., 
Direct Democracy and Political Efficacy Reconsidered, 31 POL. BEHAVIOR 401 
(2009), or may mobilize public sentiment against a particular group, see gener-
ally Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1730 (2013) (discussing the effect of direct democracy on minori-
ty rights). 
 18. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPIN-
ION, VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 165–73 (2000); Arthur Lupia, Dumber 
Than Chimps? An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters, in DANGEROUS DE-
MOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66, 66–70 (Lar-
ry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Lupia, Dumber Than Chimps?]; Ar-
thur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior 
in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994); 
Smith, supra note 17; Smith & Tolbert, supra note 17.  
 19. See generally BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 18; Lupia, Dumber 
Than Chimps?, supra note 18, at 66–70. 
 20. See generally Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When 
Common Wisdom Is Neither Common Nor Wisdom: Exploring Voters’ Limited 
Use of Endorsements on Three Ballot Measures, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1557 (2013) 
(discussing ballot measures and voter cues). 
 21. EDWARD A. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 11–12 (1989). 
 22. See VOTER GUIDE SLATE CARDS, http://www.voterguidesslatecards 
.com/PDFs/nov2012_dem.pdf (showing an example of a Democratic “how to 
vote card” for the 2012 election). 
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examples of proposals that are simply too dull to engage voters. 
Not surprisingly there is considerable roll-off on ballot votes.23 
Without recapping too much of these previous works one can 
simply say that too much can be made of how difficult voters 
find making decisions in ballot contests. While it is sensible to 
think more deeply about the kinds of processes that help facili-
tate voter decision making and provide the information voters 
need,24 a large body of empirical work shows that voters can, by 
and large, align their votes on a measure with a perception of 
their own interests or ideologies.25
II.  LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURES, AND DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY   
 Consequently, the impact of 
special interest TV spending is more muted than critics would 
suggest. The policy outcomes that result from direct democracy 
may not be the same outcome as preferred by commentators 
and policy experts, but they do seem to reflect what voters 
want. 
A second line of response to the criticisms of direct democ-
racy considers more fully the role of representatives in direct 
democracy and the supposed virtues of representative democra-
cy.26 Critics of direct democracy often make comparisons be-
tween direct and representative democracy that cast direct de-
mocracy in a bad light, arguing that when citizens are 
legislators there is insufficient deliberation of the issues in-
volved or too great a reliance on TV ads driven by sound bites 
that muddy rather than clarify the real issues at stake.27
 
 23. For the difficulties this may raise in terms of helping make sense of 
the voter’s will, see Michael D. Gilbert, Interpreting Initiatives, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1621 (2013). 
 The 
implicit standard of comparison or benchmark is that of legisla-
tors: that is, there is insufficient deliberation relative to the 
level of deliberation in legislatures, or that the TV ads in direct 
democracy campaigns are significantly more misleading than in 
 24. Burnett & McCubbins, supra note 20, at 1591–94. 
 25. See, e.g., BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 18, at 85–106 (discussing 
voters and private interests and citing recent studies that show direct democ-
racy voters can turn individual preferences into votes on policy). 
 26. See, e.g., Catherine Engberg, Note, Taking the Initiative: May Con-
gress Reform State Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican Form of 
Government?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 569, 577 (2001). 
 27. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 22, 33 (arguing that the public receives 
most of its information on initiatives through television and rarely engages in 
serious deliberation on the issues). 
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candidate elections.28
Unfortunately, representatives are not always the ideal de-
liberators that critics of direct democracy suppose. Here, for ex-
ample, is an account of the New York state legislature (New 
York is not an initiative state and so it is not a legislature 
whose behaviors are distorted by the initiative process in any 
way):  
 But there are several reasons for thinking 
that comparison is not helpful. 
The lack of debate, deliberation, and review of legislation prior to a 
final vote has produced laws that include troubling errors or, in cer-
tain cases, laws that would not have been passed if they had received 
public or legislative scrutiny. These errors range from unnecessary 
grammatical and syntactical errors that may impair enforcement and 
judicial interpretation of such laws to massive financial expenditures 
that arguably do not benefit the people of New York.29
Such problems were not one-offs but seem to be persistent fea-
tures of the New York legislature. In 2009, for example, a sub-
sequent study of the New York legislature by Stengal et al., 
took as its title Still Broken.
 
30
Similarly, concerns over the influence of money or of TV 
ads, not being willing to vote on the issues, or on minorities be-
ing targeted are all criticisms that are, have been, and will be 
repeatedly leveled at candidate elections. The example of Do-
novan’s work in this symposium shows that direct democracy 
campaigns may mobilize negative affect towards out groups—in 
his work the example is that of affect towards gays.
 
31 But it is 
also likely that candidate campaigns focused, for example, on 
illegal or undocumented aliens would have similar effects. Con-
tinuing with our example of New York—again a state untaint-
ed by the initiative process and therefore in a position to be an 
exemplar for representative democracy—the Citizen’s Union 
reports that, “[o]ne of every 11 [NY] state legislators, or 17 of 
185, who have left office since 1999 have done so because of 
ethical misconduct or criminal charges.”32
 
 28. Id. at 29. 
 
 29. JEREMY M. CREELAN & LAURA M. MOULTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUS-
TICE, THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: AN EVALUATION AND 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 47 (2004), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/legacy/d/albanyreform_finalreport.pdf. 
 30. ANDREW STENGEL ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STILL BROKEN:  
NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM, available at http://www 
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Still.Broken.pdf. 
 31. Donovan, supra note 17, at 1754–59. 
 32. CITIZENS UNION OF THE CITY OF N.Y., EXAMINING THE TURNOVER IN 
THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE: 2009–2010 UPDATE 1 (2011), available at 
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Legislatures do not fall short on the grounds of deliberation 
alone. Other concerns relating to legislatures include worries 
over the role of money in legislative politics and in legislative 
elections, the role of special interests, negative campaigns, and 
the exaggerated influence of the more ideologically extreme via 
primary elections.33 Indeed whole swathes of the discipline of 
political science either assume or examine the degree to which 
special interest money sways legislators, and the ways in which 
they fail to represent groups or pay too much attention to the 
loudest groups.34
That is, the very same kinds of criticisms we see leveled at 
direct democracy can be, and are repeatedly, leveled at repre-
sentative democracy. In fact, at times, political science as a dis-
cipline comprises a catalogue of the pathologies of representa-
tive democracy in studies on shirking, corruption, polarization, 
and rent seeking. As Sirico notes in his study of restrictions on 
the initiative process, “[q]ualities such as the deliberative and 
representative nature of government generally describe mat-
ters of degree rather than of kind. As distinguishing standards, 
such qualities prove unhelpful when attempting to define the 
general character of government.”
  
35
 
http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_ 
ExaminingTurnover_Update_Feb2011.pdf. 
 
 33. See, e.g., Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The 
Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Cam-
paigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1243 (2008) (documenting the perva-
sive influence of special interest groups in judicial campaigns); David Cole, 
First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 237 (1991) (arguing that without government in-
tervention, elections can go to the highest bidder); Lee Goldman, False Cam-
paign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82 TUL. L. REV. 889, 889 
(2008) (stating that a great deal of campaign advertisement is false and mis-
leads voters). 
 34. Extreme examples of political failure of representative democracy can 
be seen in European governments, where a succession of short term financial 
decisions made by elected representatives—notably in Greece and Italy—led 
to a series of troubles. Niki Kitsantonis, Greek Leaders Fail to Reach Consen-
sus on Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2011, at B5; Graham Bowley et al., Italy 
Pushed Closer to Financial Brink, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/business/global/italy-pushed-closer-to-financial-brink 
.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=299BCD417AD2C1E018A90EF423C8A047. 
Elected politicians were not trusted to solve the problems they created which 
led to greater reliance on technocrats, i.e. non-democratic solutions. The Unit-
ed States seems quite far away from those sorts of solutions, although the 
bankruptcy of a number of local and city governments does suggest that there 
may be small-scale analogies. 
 35. Louis J. Siroco, Jr., The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Refer-
endum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 632, 652 (1980).   
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It would seem that—since elections of any kind are subject 
to failings related to the role of money, special interests, or lack 
of deliberation—the criticisms of direct democracy elections 
provide a justification for limiting all kinds of elections. If vot-
ers are not trusted to vote “properly” on the issues of abortion, 
gay rights, death penalty, or taxes directly, are they also not 
trusted to vote “properly” on the candidates who will legislate 
these issues? The answer to this hypothetical question should 
be “no.” Survey evidence suggests that despite its flaws or per-
ceived flaws, voter support for the initiative process remains 
strong.36
Stepping back a little from the pushing and shoving im-
plied by a framing of representative democracy versus direct 
democracy, we see that in many ways the distinction between 
the two processes is somewhat artificial.  
 
A potential criticism of direct democracy may be that it fo-
cuses quite heavily on the initiative, but even in the initiative 
process, politicians often take a prominent role.37 Often, this 
role can involve promoting, supporting, and encouraging dis-
criminatory legislation.38
 
 36. See, e.g., Mark Baldassare et al., California’s Initiative Process: 100 
Years Old, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. 1, 2 (Sept. 2011), http://www.ppic.org/ 
content/pubs/jtf/JTF_InitiativeJTF.pdf (reporting that sixty-two percent of 
California voters think decisions made through the initiative process are 
“probably better . . . than public policy decisions made by the governor and 
state legislature”). A striking feature of survey work on direct democracy is 
that the polling tends to gravitate towards plumbing voters’ concerns about 
direct democracy, such as whether there are too many proposals or too much 
money being spent. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COM-
ING AGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 167–68 (2008). The end result is a puzzling 
one: voters may list many flaws but still like the process. Such an irrational 
combination, where voters dislike everything about the process and still like 
the process, might justify limited direct democracy. Unfortunately, polling on 
attitudes about the process of voting may not examine voter attitudes about 
representative democracy as an institution. If voters were asked nontradition-
al polling questions, such as whether they think legislators care more about 
being re-elected than they care about ordinary citizens, it is conceivable that 
for all the flaws of direct democracy, voters see representative democracy as 
even more flawed. It is hard, then, to put evaluations of direct democracy 
against a proper context of attitudes towards democratic processes more gen-
erally. 
 The point is that even initiative ballot 
 37. Smith & Tolbert, supra note 7, at 741 (noting that the potential to in-
crease voter turnout, use a ballot issue against an opposing party, and ideolog-
ical compatibility between party platform and ballot measure are “three moti-
vating factors why major [political] parties are becoming more involved in the 
initiative process”). 
 38. Former governor Pete Wilson’s use of Proposition 187, aimed at curb-
ing illegal immigration to spur his re-election campaign in 1994 is a notable 
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propositions may be strongly influenced by representatives. 
This point is underscored when we consider referenda. Legisla-
tive referenda are measures placed on the ballot by state legis-
latures39—by far the most common type of direct democracy in 
the American states.40 They are more frequent than initia-
tives,41 they are more likely to change the constitution than ini-
tiatives,42 and they pass at higher rates.43 Although referenda 
have received surprisingly little scholarly attention, they are 
both numerous and consequential. For example, between 1990 
and 2008 referenda outnumbered initiatives by approximately 
two to one (1768 to 751) and were, of course, used in a larger 
number of states than the initiative.44
 
example. See Dale Mahardige, The Sleeping Giant Awakes, MOTHER JONES, 
Feb. 1998, at 56, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/01/ 
sleeping-giant-awakes (“Using Proposition 187 to help his re-election cam-
paign in 1994 and Proposition 209 in his doomed presidential bid two years 
ago, Wilson has actively courted the white voter base . . . .”); Susan Davis, 
Shades of Prop 187? Pete Wilson Cuts Immigration Ad for Whitman, WSJ 
BLOG (May 11, 2010, 4:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/05/11/ 
shades-of-prop-187-pete-wilson-cuts-immigration-ad-for-whitman/ (“Wilson 
was re-elected governor of California in 1994 by making his support of Propo-
sition 187—aimed at barring illegal immigrants from using California social 
services—a centerpiece of his campaign.”). 
 In the 2012 election this 
pattern continued: across 38 states there were approximately 
174 issues put to voters, 115 of which were legislative referen-
 39. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democ-
racy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 694 (2010) (defin-
ing referenda “to be statutes or constitutional amendments that a representa-
tive body refers to the citizens for approval or rejection”); Initiative, 
Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/initiative-referendum-and 
-recall-overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (“There are two primary types 
of referenda: the legislative referendum, whereby the Legislature refers a 
measure to the voters for their approval, and the popular referendum, a meas-
ure that appears on the ballot as a result of a voter petition drive.”). 
 40. TODD DONOVAN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS 
AND REFORM 117 (3d ed. 2012). 
 41. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 137–
38 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
 42. See id. 
 43. RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 
IN AMERICA 4 (2002). 
 44. Ballot Measures Database, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/ballot-measures 
-database.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (select “all states,” “any topic area,” 
years 1990 through 2008, “any” election type, and “initiative” under measure 
type and submit query, then repeat using “legislative referendum” instead of 
“initiative”). 
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da.45 While some referenda may be constitutionally mandated,46 
some of the referenda reflect deliberate choices by politicians 
seeking to change a constitution and commit future generations 
to a particular policy on taxes or social issues.47 Professors Cain 
and Noll raise concerns about the hypermalleability of constitu-
tions that put in place constraints and restrictions that subse-
quently lead to inflexibility.48 Too many constitutional amend-
ments are, in their view, a bad thing. A large part of the 
problem they identify is due to changes introduced by initiative 
process and many of the examples they discuss, such as term 
limits in California,49 are taken from the initiative process. 
That said, even Cain and Noll acknowledge that “[n]inety per-
cent of amendments are proposed by legislatures,”50 and yet, it 
is often the initiative process that bears the brunt of criticism 
of many commentators. Yet the referendum process sees a se-
ries of proposals put on the ballot by legislators by choice, often 
intended at constitutional change to lock in their policy prefer-
ences, some of which seem aimed at ideological rivals or minor-
ities or both.51 Recent examples include attempts by legislators 
to challenge the Affordable Care Act,52 Oklahoma’s legislatively 
referred Question 755 that sought to outlaw the use of Sharia 
in Oklahoma state courts,53
 
 45. 2012 Ballot Measures: Election Results, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/ballot 
-measures-2012-homepage.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
 Oklahoma’s legislatively referred 
Question 751 on the same ballot that sought to make English 
 46. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, supra 
note 41, at 137. 
 47. Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on 
State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1521–22 (2009).  
 48. Id. at 1520 (“The emerging pattern of hyperamendability combined 
with infrequent revision has significant political consequences.”). 
 49. Id. at 1524.  
 50. Id. at 1520. 
 51. See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Ev-
idence from California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POLS. 154, 172–74 
(2002). 
 52. See generally State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain 
Health Reforms, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-laws 
-and-actions-challenging-ppaca.aspx (last updated Jan. 2013) (documenting 
the legislative action of twenty states to proscribe elements of the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act). 
 53. H.R.J. Res. 1056, State Question No. 755, Legis. Referendum No. 355, 
52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/ 
documents/questions/755.pdf. 
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the official language,54 North Carolina’s (anti) same-sex mar-
riage referendum in May 2012,55 and Minnesota’s same-sex 
marriage referendum in November 2012.56
These examples of the heavy involvement of representa-
tives in direct democracy processes support two observations. 
First, a focus on the initiative process alone is a misleading 
guide to direct democracy in the United States because legisla-
tors can indirectly use the initiative process via the referendum 
process. Second, blaming the initiative process for pathologies 
of direct democracy, and not the extent that politicians are in-
volved in the process, seems at best misguided and at worst un-
fair. Some of the supposed pathologies of direct democracy 
should be laid squarely at the doorstep of politicians them-
selves. Garrett’s term of “hybrid” democracy aptly suggests 
there is room for a great deal of overlap between direct and 
representative processes.
 
57
Overall these points relating to the legislature do not offer 
much of a rationale for limiting just direct democracy, but—on 
the grounds of consistency—must surely offer a rationale for 
limiting representative democracy as well. What critics of di-
 “Reforming” direct democracy and 
giving more power to politicians while taking it away from vot-
ers based on the failings of special interest politics and the role 
of money or misleading advertising would seem to be a case of 
blaming the victim for displaying exactly the same traits as the 
perpetrator. 
 
 54. H.R.J. Res. 1042, State Question No. 751, Legis. Referendum No. 351, 
52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2009), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/ 
documents/questions/751.pdf. 
 55. S.B. 514, 2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/ 
Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/HTML/S514v3.html. 
 56. S.F. 1308, 87th Leg. (Minn. 2011), available at https://www.revisor.mn 
.gov/bills/bill.php?b=senate&f=SF1308&ssn=0&y=2011. To be sure, within the 
literature on the initiative process there is debate over the extent to which the 
pure majority rule of the initiative adversely impacts minority rights. Hajnal 
et al., supra note 51, at 172–74 (addressing the consequences of direct democ-
racy on racial and ethnic minorities); see also Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civ-
il Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 261 (1997) (“Citizens in the 
political majority have repeatedly used direct democracy to put the rights of 
political minorities to a popular vote.”); Donald P. Haider-Markel et al., Lose, 
Win, or Draw?: A Reexamination of Direct Democracy and Minority Rights, 60 
POL. RES. Q. 304, 312 (2007) (evaluating data on the impact of direct democra-
cy on gay and lesbian civil rights). As the examples of legislative referenda 
show, however, anti-minority legislation is not unique to the initiative process. 
 57. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Campaign Finance in the Hybrid 
Realm of Recall Elections, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1654 (2013) (considering how 
blurred the line between direct and representative democracy may become). 
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rect democracy need are a set of criticisms that lead to a justifi-
cation for only or primarily limiting direct democracy or limit-
ing some of the worst features of both. The idea of a “republican 
form of government” provides the silver bullet that can stop di-
rect democracy. 
III.  A “REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT” AS A 
PRINCIPLED OBJECTION TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY   
Part of the weakness of the criticisms of direct democracy, 
and why the criticisms spill over so freely into a critique of rep-
resentative democracy, is that they tend to be grounded in em-
pirical or practical failings rather than failings of principle. In a 
rush to criticize direct democracy elections and direct democra-
cy electorates, critics also end up criticizing elections and elec-
torates more generally. Plainly, no one wishes to see the end of 
electoral democracy. What critics need is an argument that ap-
plies solely, or at least mostly, to direct democracy. The single 
subject rule provides some basis for limiting specific proposals 
by the action of the courts.58 But relying on such a rule intro-
duces a level of idiosyncrasy in what it may apply to, and hence 
narrows the scope of specific proposals but does not speak to 
the process more generally. What critics of direct democracy 
seek is a wider-ranging principle that will allow for far greater 
restrictions on direct democracy. An example of an argument 
like this might cite the Guarantee Clause,59
To be sure, the use of the Guarantee Clause to shut down 
direct democracy is not a new idea. It was an argument used in 
the first major challenge to the constitutionality of the initia-
tive process in the Supreme Court case, Pacific States Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.
 in effect using the 
term “republican form of government” as a synonym for “only a 
representative form of government.” 
60
 
 58. See Gilbert, supra note 
 But in that decision the 
23, at 1637–38 (“[M]ost states have a ‘single 
subject rule’ which is designed to limit initiatives to a single issue.”); Michael 
D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adju-
dication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 339 (2011) (explaining that judges use the 
single subject rule to prevent provisions from becoming law with only minority 
support). 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 60. 223 U.S. 118, 137 (1912) (“[T]he single contention [is] that the creation 
by a state of the power to legislate by the initiative and referendum causes the 
prior lawful state government to be bereft of its lawful character as the result 
of the provisions of § 4 of article 4 of the Constitution . . . .”). 
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Court declined to define the term “republican form of govern-
ment” itself, arguing that the definition was of a political char-
acter and, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.61 The 
Court’s decision, however, has not stopped critics such as 
Chemerinsky62 and Engberg63 from suggesting that the Guar-
antee Clause is a way to limit direct democracy in wide-ranging 
ways.64
It is important to underscore that criticism grounded in the 
Guarantee Clause is potentially a very powerful argument. In 
contrast to the criticisms based on claims over the empirical 
workings of direct democracy which often seem ad hoc, this is 
one grounded in constitutional principle.
 
65
 
 61. Id. at 149–50 (“It is indeed a singular misconception of the nature and 
character of our constitutional system of government to suggest that the set-
tled distinction which the doctrine just stated points out between judicial au-
thority over justiciable controversies and legislative power as to purely politi-
cal questions tends to destroy the duty of the judiciary in proper cases to 
enforce the Constitution.”). For a more extensive review of the case, see Thom-
as C. Berg, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial 
Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 211 (1987); see also Timothy M. Tymkovich, 
Are State Constitutions Constitutional?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1804, 1812 (2013) 
(discussing justiciability and the Guarantee Clause). 
 Furthermore, in con-
trast to the criticisms that apply to both direct and representa-
tive democracy, criticisms based on the Guarantee Clause will 
apply solely to direct democracy. It is thus an argument that on 
 62. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 301 (“My most dramatic argument 
is that the initiative process should be declared unconstitutional because it 
violates [Article 4, § 4 of the Constitution].”). 
 63. See Engberg, supra note 26, at 589 (discussing whether the Guarantee 
Clause also protects state initiative lawmaking and opining “[w]hile it is un-
clear how much protection the Guarantee Clause provides states against fed-
eral intervention, the amount is probably not negligible”). 
 64. See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-
Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 969 
(2005) (“[W]ith the increasing use of initiatives to change policy and reform 
constitutions, further constraints may be placed on legislative activity. Indeed, 
as direct democracy ties up the legislatures, we may begin to run afoul of Arti-
cle 4, § 4 of the Constitution, which guarantees every state a republican form 
of government.”); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republi-
can Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 43 
(1993) (“When an initiative amendment includes affirmative legislation, the 
legislature and the state courts might as well not exist. [Judicial opinion] does 
not save such initiatives, regardless of subject, from the Guaranty Clause.”); 
Tymkovich, supra note 61, at 1815 (“[T]he initiative and referendum process 
itself may not be enough to implicate the [Guarantee] Clause, but when the 
results of the process reach a certain degree of deviation from republican 
norms, they may become subject to the limits of the Clause.”). 
 65. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 301; Engberg, supra note 26, at 
589. 
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the face of it needs taking seriously and one that cannot be re-
butted by empirical findings. It is not, however, an argument 
that is entirely persuasive. This is the case for several reasons. 
In a practical sense, the Court has ruled that the form of gov-
ernment is a political question, beyond the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.66 Unless the Court overturns itself on this ruling, 
the arguments of Chemerinsky and others are moot.67 But more 
than that, such arguments are mistaken because there exists 
considerable room for disagreement over the degree to which a 
“republican form of government” is inconsistent with direct 
democracy.68
It does seem clear that common usage of the term does not 
support the idea that “republican” is a synonym for “purely rep-
resentative.” This is the case whether we look at usage in the 
eighteenth century or today. For example, the sixth edition of 
Dr. Samuel Johnson’s 1766 dictionary—a dictionary of the Eng-
lish language contemporary to the American revolutinary peri-
od—defined “Republican” as an adjective to mean “Placing the 
government in the people,” and a noun meaning, “One who 
thinks a commonwealth without monarchy the best govern-
ment.”
 
69 “Republick” was defined as a “state in which the power 
is lodged in more than one” and “Common interest: the 
publick.”70 The current Oxford English Dictionary defines “re-
public” as “A state in which power rests with the people or their 
representatives; spec. a state without a monarchy.”71
 
 66. See Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 150. 
 In the 
 67. Engberg takes the different tack of accepting that the task of restrict-
ing the initiative does fall to Congress and uses the Guarantee Clause to argue 
that Congress does indeed have the right to do so. See Engberg, supra note 26, 
at 585 (arguing that the Court should defer to Congress’s “superior ability to 
make legislative findings,” and hold that “Congress would not violate horizon-
tal separation of powers by legislating under the Guarantee Clause,” because 
the Court has “not yet fully enforced [the Guarantee Clause]”). 
 68. For an extended discussion of the problems, see generally Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, 
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994) 
(discussing how disagreements about the meaning of a “Republican Govern-
ment,” termed “the denominator problem,” contributed to the historical devel-
opments surrounding the nation’s Founding, Antebellum, and Civil War eras). 
 69. SAMUEL JOHNSON, Republick Definition, in A DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 501 (photo. reprint 2008) (6th ed. 1766), available at  
http://www.archive.org/stream/dictionaryofengl02johnuoft#page/n499/mode/ 
2up (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
 70. Id.; see also Amar, supra note 68, at 752–60 (comparing modern inter-
pretations of the “concept of Republican Government”).  
 71. Republic Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Dec. 
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current period the definition has shifted a little to include rep-
resentatives, but not as the sole component of the definition. 
Plain English language usage, then, does not support the idea 
that a republican form of government is one in which direct 
democracy is forbidden. 
But there are other troubling issues in seeking to anchor 
an objection to direct democracy in some version of the intent of 
the Framers. This is partly because any plausible interpreta-
tion of their intended definition of “representative” embraces 
some features that are now widely regarded as illegitimate. 
The central questions of who is being represented and how con-
tentious issues and such questions are resolved are inherent in 
any use of the term “representation,”72 even within United 
States constitutional practice. Even at as late a date as the Pa-
cific States decision in 1912, for example, women and minori-
ties were completely disenfranchised.73 It would seem unlikely 
that those who argue that a republican or representative form 
of government in the states means the end of direct democracy 
would also argue that only white males should be allowed to 
stand and vote in state elections.74 But even if we exclude the 
more obvious demographic objections to a definition of “republi-
can” as “representative as meant by the Founders” then the de-
gree of flexibility in the term representative is striking. 
Throughout U.S. political history, the manner in which elec-
tions to choose representatives are conducted and to whom rep-
resentatives are accountable have all varied markedly.75 This 
variation not only occurred over time but also occurs over 
place.76 There is an astonishing variety of democratic practice 
in the United States. In the current period this variation em-
braces practices that include multi-member districts,77
 
2012), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163158?redirectedFrom=republic&. 
 New 
 72. See generally A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 13–18 (Leonard Schapiro 
& Peter Calvert eds., 1971) (discussing the meaning of “representation”); Am-
ar, supra note 68, at 766–73 (discussing how geography and demography are 
two factors that contributed to the understanding of republican government 
during the “Founding Era”). 
 73. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8 
(Cecilia Wainryb et al. eds., 2008). 
 74. Amar discusses these issues in terms of a “denominator problem.” 
Amar, supra note 68, at 766–73. 
 75. Joshua J. Scott, Elections, Local and State, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 129 (Larry Sabato & Howard 
R. Ernst eds., 2006). 
 76. Id.  
 77. See THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 58 (George E. 
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England Town Hall meetings,78 and wide differences over voter 
identification laws, voter competence laws, voter registration 
laws, and felon (dis)enfranchisement, as well as wide variation 
in laws governing participation in primaries.79
Finally, even if we allow for a “technical” or possibly idio-
syncratic use of the term, it is still not clear whether any and 
all expression of the initiative or any and all voice for voters 
(e.g., in ratifying constitutional changes) is at odds with repub-
lican government since they are not expressly forbidden. That 
is, even if one argues that English language usage of the term 
“republican” is not appropriate but that in a technical sense it 
can indeed be used as a synonym for “representative” in some 
kind of original intent reading, and even if one argues, further, 
that there are definitions of “representative” that somehow ac-
commodate both modern practices and original intentions, then 
it is still not the case that direct democracy is expressly forbid-
den. Standard practice in the United States suggests that the 
default is that if a practice is not forbidden it is allowed. 
 Given this huge 
variation in the practice of representation, it is hard to see how 
one can use the term “representative form of government” to 
capture an ideal type of democratic practice in any concise way 
let alone as a useful benchmark against which to judge direct 
democracy. Even the brief list of the varieties of representative 
democracy practiced in the United States suggests that there 
are problems in using “representative” as an analytical bench-
mark in order to judge direct democracy: do we measure direct 
democracy against a New England Town Hall Meeting or 
against majority/minority districts that help ensure the ethnici-
ty of the winner?  
Amar goes further in arguing not just that the term “re-
publican form” does not mean banning direct democracy, but 
that a proper reading of the term in effect guarantees direct 
democracy.80
 
Connor & Christopher W. Hammond eds., 2008). 
 In his discussion of republican government, Amar 
 78. Id.  
 79. See generally Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Voting Law 
Changes in 2012, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2011), http://www 
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/VRE/Brennan_Voting_
Law_V10.pdf. Oddly, the Town Hall Meeting system—an authentic American 
tradition of popular involvement which would seem to have some overlap with 
the initiative process certainly in spirit—does not seem to attract the same de-
gree of criticism as the initiative process. In fact it does not seem to attract 
any criticism at all.  
 80. See Amar, supra note 68, at 763–66.  
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develops an understanding of the theme of who are “the People” 
and what is their proper role.81 Along the way he notes that the 
phrases from Madison—whose definition seems to be the most 
important definition of “republic” returned to in this discus-
sion82—have become more central in retrospect than at the 
time.83
Republican Government did have a central meaning at the Founding 
and for a century thereafter. Many current theories of Republican 
Government sidestep this central meaning; and one theory—a strong 
form of the Anti-Direct Democracy Thesis—comes close, at least rhe-
torically, to betraying the central meaning. The central meaning of 
Republican Government revolved tightly around popular sovereignty, 
majority rule, and the people’s right to alter or abolish.
 Amar believes that there is, in fact, a settled definition 
of “republican government” within the context of the founding 
of the U.S. Constitution that implies popular sovereignty: 
84
Repeated references to “the People” in United States and state 
constitutional and legal practice make it plain that it is not 
elected representatives who are sovereign—it is “the People”—
however defined. Amar’s argument is one that leaves little 
room for those who wish to use “republican form of govern-
ment” as a means to quash direct democracy. 
 
Ultimately, it is important to recognize that playing the 
“republican form of government” card does not allow for the 
elimination of direct democracy. Nor does a reading of the 
Guarantee Clause seem to provide any sure or concrete guide to 
the ways in which we might restrict direct democracy short of 
banning it outright. But the reminder of the idea of sovereignty 
 
 81. See id. at 750–51. 
 82. See id. at 756–59. Indeed, in a non-legal sense, it seems that the whole 
debate over whether the initiative is consistent with a republican form of gov-
ernment consists of parsing Madison’s usage and arguing that it only really 
amounts to one of the components identified in the OED definition. In other 
words, it really only means representative government but he chose not to use 
that word. See discussion supra Part III. That may be the case, but in histori-
cal context one would think that at the time there were some concerns over 
backsliding into monarchy via the backdoor of states if Loyalists could organ-
ize. It would seem then that the “no monarch” component of the term was in 
mind at the time. Furthermore, in terms of historical uses to the word of 
which Madison was well aware, the Roman Republic was—like the United 
States at the time—a republican form of government which allowed slavery.  
 83. Amar, supra note 68, at 756 (“Though [Madison’s Federalist] Number 
10 is now canonical, its role at the Founding and for the next century was far 
more modest.”). 
 84. Id. at 786; see also Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of Re-
publican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 
227–31 (1987) (discussing the farmers’ vision of republicanism, with “popular 
rule as its fundamental principle”).  
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may lead to a way forward. We can see this by reference to 
British discussions on sovereignty. 
IV.  SOVEREIGNTY AS A GUIDE TO LIMITING DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY   
In some ways the British constitutional example of Par-
liamentary sovereignty is a difficult one to bring to bear on a 
discussion of direct democracy in the United States. In the 
United Kingdom, constitutional practice is embedded within an 
“unwritten” constitution.85 Further, within the United Kingdom 
it is Parliament that is sovereign, not the people.86
As with any constitutional construct, there are debates 
over the concept of sovereignty.
 There are 
key elements of the British definition of sovereignty that make 
it an unlikely or unreasonable guide for the United States ex-
perience at the state level. But British experience is both his-
torically relevant and also practically relevant in the sense that 
it provides a record of an extant and extensive debate over 
what sovereignty means, specifically whether sovereignty may 
be located in the people or in parliament.  
87 The idea of sovereignty can be 
troublesome since there is an inherent tension between having 
a sovereign who has a large degree of power and imposing lim-
its on the exercise of that power. Discussions in the United 
Kingdom, for example, consider a series of de facto limits on 
parliamentary sovereignty imposed by a series of political deci-
sions.88 In the United Kingdom, the setting up of sub-national 
governments in Scotland and Wales and other changes includ-
ing European Union membership may even challenge the idea 
of sovereignty itself.89
 
 85. See JEFFERY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CON-
TEMPORARY DEBATES 16 (2010). 
 There are also discussions over the ex-
 86. Id. at 106.  
 87. See, e.g., id. at 113 (discussing parliamentary sovereignty and criticiz-
ing the theory of “common law constitutionalism,” which holds that Parlia-
ment is not sovereign because its authority is subordinate to common law); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427 
(1987) (arguing that “no government entity can enjoy plenary ‘sovereign’ im-
munity from a suit alleging a violation of constitutional right”); Stuart Lakin, 
Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of 
Legality in the British Constitution, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 709 (2008) (ar-
guing that the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty is misconceived).  
 88. See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 85, at 105–37. 
 89. See Mark Elliott, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the New Constitu-
tional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political Reality and Convention, 22 LEGAL 
STUD. 340, 353 (2002) (arguing that while devolution is consistent with the 
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tent to which legal authority may limit parliamentary sover-
eignty.90
Australian or Canadian versions of parliamentary sover-
eignty may offer more directly comparable examples to the 
United States case since both their parliaments exercise sover-
eignty within limits imposed by both federalism and a written 
constitution.
 
91 Fundamental rights, for example, are typically 
put beyond the reach of whatever sovereign is in place (Parlia-
ment, the people).92 In the United States, this means that 
courts already play a role in ruling some popular initiatives un-
constitutional.93 If anything, these limits suggest that an exist-
ing de facto limit of direct democracy is that it cannot be used 
to deny rights, but may be used to extend them. In this Essay, I 
take those types of limits on direct democracy as given. That is, 
there will be judicial review of initiatives with respect to basic 
rights.94
Putting to one side these concerns, and the many and im-
portant differences between the United Kingdom and United 
States settings, key components of the definition of sovereignty 
in the United Kingdom setting are helpful in identifying tests 
that may help discuss limits on direct democracy.  
  
In the United Kingdom, sovereignty is taken to mean that 
Parliament can make and unmake any law, meaning that Par-
liament cannot bind its successor.95
 
theory of Parliamentary sovereignty, it creates practical challenges); cf. N.W. 
Barber, The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 144, 
149 (2011) (discussing the implication of the European Communities Act of 
1972 on Parliamentary sovereignty).  
 This definition means that 
 90. See generally JEFFERY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIA-
MENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (1999) (tracing the development of Parlia-
ment’s authority and discussing the relation of judges, common law, and stat-
ute law). 
 91. Discussions of sovereignty in the United States often seem to consider 
the role and powers of the states within the federal system. See, e.g., John C. 
Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 
27, 27–28 (1998) (commenting on state sovereignty being subject to judicial 
review). A related discussion is that of the idea of state sovereign immunity. 
See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereign Immunity and the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 65–66 (1989). 
 92. See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 90, at 14. 
 93. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, Natural Law and Popular Sover-
eignty: The Irish Legal Order, 86 STUD.: IRISH Q. REV. 215, 217–18 (1997) (dis-
cussing limits imposed by natural law in Ireland, where the parliamentary 
system, while not a federal system, works within the framework of a written 
constitution).  
 95. See Parliamentary Sovereignty, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www 
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there is, in effect, an inter-generational constitutional contract 
in which future generations are not only not bound by the cur-
rent generation, but that the current generation should not put 
in place binding constraints on future generations.96
One clear example of a category of proposals that would be 
ruled out on the basis of sovereignty are those proposals that 
require more votes to amend or overturn the proposal than it 
took to pass the proposal in the first place. Tax relief proposals, 
to take a concrete example, are sometimes passed with simple 
majorities but may require a supermajority to be overturned.
 This quite 
simple idea has a number of straightforward consequences in 
terms of constitutional practices that apply quite directly to the 
direct democracy settings where one generation of voters is lim-
ited in how it may bind the current generation. 
97
A second area in which limitations may be imposed comes 
when we consider attempts to change constitutions by direct 
democracy. A common tactic among United States politicians is 
to try to use constitutional amendments to, as Cain and Noll 
put it, “lock in . . . temporary advantage[s].”
 
The concept of sovereignty would suggest that such efforts are 
improper attempts by the current generation to bind future 
generations. That is, under the doctrine of sovereignty, pro-
posals passed by the initiative should be as easy to amend as 
they are to pass in the first place in order to avoid binding the 
hands of successor generations. 
98
 
.parliament.uk/about/how/sovereignty/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (“Generally, 
the courts cannot overrule [Parliament’s] legislation and no Parliament can 
pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change.”).  
 For example, Re-
publicans, in contrast to Democrats, may prefer tax decreases 
or limitations on tax increases. Placing restrictions on tax in-
creases in the constitution—such as requiring a super-majority 
vote for tax increases to pass—makes it much harder for Demo-
crats to subsequently try and raise taxes. But the tactic is not 
limited to taxation. Placing restrictions on availability of abor-
tion or gay marriage within the constitution will also make 
change much harder to accomplish. Such attempts plainly limit 
the ability of future generations to make or unmake any law. 
Indeed, that is the purpose of such restrictions. These re-
strictions thus limit sovereignty whether passed by legislators 
or by voters and as such deserve judicial scrutiny. One possibil-
 96. Id.  
 97. Cain & Noll, supra note 47, at 1543. 
 98. Id. at 1521.  
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ity is to make attempts to bind future generations more ardu-
ous. Attempts to amend the constitution could and, in light of 
concerns over sovereignty, should be held to a much higher set 
of thresholds and barriers than those attempting to introduce a 
simple statute. On those grounds it would be reasonable to re-
quire many more signatures to qualify constitutional measures 
than to qualify measures that propose statutes. It would also be 
reasonable to require that changes to the constitution meet 
higher vote totals than statutory measures—possibly even su-
permajorities or voting on two ballots—in order to be enacted.99
In contrast to the wish of many who advocate for the aboli-
tion of direct democracy—possibly through application of the 
Guarantee Clause
 
100—the restrictions proposed here may seem 
quite modest. As modest as they may be, an argument ground-
ed in the doctrine of sovereignty involves process based tests 
and not outcome based ones.101 As such, and as modest as the 
restrictions may be that are proposed here, they may be re-
strictions subject to judicial decision. Judges are understanda-
bly reluctant to overturn the voice of the people when they have 
decided a particular outcome.102
 
 99. Both the example of restricting constitutional amendment by direct 
democracy and the example of embedding in hard to overturn votes are exam-
ples included in the NCSL list of recommendations. See NCSL 2002 REPORT, 
supra note 
 This alone would suggest some 
hesitation by the courts in deciding that many aspects of direct 
democracy are justiciable even without the precedent of Pacific 
States. By contrast, ruling on matters such as vote require-
ments would be judgments on process and not judgments on 
outcomes produced by the expression of popular will. These 
would be more feasibly justiciable kinds of rulings than ones on 
outcomes. The doctrine of sovereignty, then, not only provides 
some specific guidance on what kinds of limits may be placed 
on direct democracy, it also allows for court rulings on those 
limits. On that basis alone, an argument grounded in the idea 
of sovereignty provides a more useful tool than one grounded in 
the Guarantee Clause. 
11, at 37, 58.  
 100. See discussion supra Part III.  
 101. Elizabeth Beaumont, Panel Discussion at the University of Minnesota 
Law Review Symposium: A More Perfect Union? Democracy in the Age of Bal-
lot Initiatives (Oct. 26, 2012).  
 102. See Gilbert, supra note 23, at 1632–1644 (discussing issues surround-
ing identifying voter intent and majority will).  
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V.  DISCUSSION   
The end result—the answer to the question of “when is it 
OK to limit direct democracy?”—is more or less “hardly ever,” 
and then only on procedural grounds. As an answer it is, per-
haps, something of a let down. It is not something that would 
satisfy critics of direct democracy who seek a more thoroughgo-
ing muzzling of the process. But it does offer one path to find-
ing a principled reason for limiting some of what direct democ-
racy does. It is also a path that is justiciable and so can be 
applied without necessarily asking Congress to legislate or ask-
ing the Supreme Court to overturn precedent. It may, then, 
have some practical application and be a means by which some 
limitations on direct democracy maybe imposed. 
Nevertheless, while this line of argument does open up 
some possibilities of ways in which we might be able to limit di-
rect democracy, that does not mean we should limit the process.  
Critics of direct democracy seem to share many of the 
Founding Fathers’ fears of majority rule. They rely on a model 
of democracy that is inescapably elitist. This may well be a 
normative model that is consistent with American constitu-
tional practice, but that does not mean it is without flaw. Writ-
ing in 1966, Walker criticized academic scholars of the time for 
being wedded to a particular version of democracy and demo-
cratic institutions that emphasize attributes of the system, and 
value system maintenance, often at the cost of undervaluing 
such attributes as social movements.103 Consistent with the an-
ti-majoritarian fears of the Founders, social movements are of-
ten seen as manifestations of political extremism and are often 
seen as threats to the system.104 For Walker, the social move-
ments were those relating to race relations,105
 
 103. Jack L. Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 285, 293 (1966) (“The primary concerns of the elitist theorists 
have been the maintenance of democratic stability, the preservation of demo-
cratic procedures, and the creation of machinery which would produce efficient 
administration and coherent public policies. With these goals in mind, social 
movements (if they have been studied at all) have usually been pictured as 
threats to democracy, as manifestations of ‘political extremism.’”).  
 but in the mod-
ern period we may have our rough equivalents in the Tea Party 
and the Occupy movements. Far from fearing such movements, 
Walker sees movements like these as authentic expressions of 
popular will that provide valuable information about where the 
 104. Id. at 293. 
 105. Id. at 289–90. 
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political system should be going from the bottom up.106 In con-
trast, elitist theories emphasize the top-down.107
Arguably, that same critique applies today. The initiative 
process is a realization of a non-elitist form of democratic gov-
ernance and one that allows the expression of popular views. 
Views that—in part by constitutional design and in part by po-
litical practice—are not adequately or appropriately represent-
ed by elected officials. In fact, there are very few principled ar-
guments in support of limiting or reducing the say of people in 
government. At the end of it all, the idea that we need to limit 
direct democracy implies limiting the role of citizens. Given 
that the sweep of constitutional and political history across the 
Western world since the seventeenth century has been to ex-
pand the role of citizens and the definition of citizenry, any at-
tempt to say we have gone too far and need to step back and 
become less democratic is a tough position to argue. After all, 
asking the question of when it is OK to limit direct democracy 
really is a version of the broader question of when it is OK to 
limit democracy. We should think carefully before supporting 
limits on the popular voice. 
 
 
 
 
 106. Id. at 290. 
 107. For Walker this robbed the idea of democracy of some of its im-
portance. By emphasizing an elitist theory, “contemporary political scientists 
have stripped democracy of much of its radical élan and have diluted its utopi-
an vision, thus rendering it inadequate as a guide to the future.” Id. at 295.  
